William George : Information Flow Management in Cryptoeconomics: Antiprevelation in Kleros

A cryptoeconomic mechanism designer can structure rewards and penalties in a game in order to try to incentivize certain behavior; however, as evidenced by classic cryptoeconomic problems such as the Data Availability problem and the deanonymization of wallets through transaction analysis, the flow of information leaked, or withheld, by participants is a fundamental aspect of a game. In this talk, we will overview these ideas in general and particularly discuss them in the case of Kleros, a blockchain based dispute resolution platform in which one might want the votes of arbitrators to be hidden until a fixed time when they are revealed. We will discuss the mixture of cryptographic, game theoretic, and technical tools that one can apply to enable and incentivize desired information flow.

Видео William George : Information Flow Management in Cryptoeconomics: Antiprevelation in Kleros канала [EthCC] Livestream 6