Elected Leaders & Informal Tax Contributions: Experiment Evidence, Village Elections, Kazakhstan

Please join the Harriman Institute for a lecture by Masaaki Higashijima. Moderated by Timothy Frye.

Do elections for local leaders boost informal tax collection and public goods provision? Existing observational and lab experiments find inconclusive effects, with some studies showing that traditional, unelected leaders secure greater contributions. Masaaki Higashijima combines a natural experiment—the random timing of the introduction of village elections in Kazakhstan—with a survey experiment to test whether elected leaders elicit greater citizen willingness to contribute to local projects than leaders appointed by higher authorities. He also expects stronger effects among men than women. The analysis shows elected village chiefs attract greater contributions than appointed chiefs. Surprisingly, the effect is more pronounced for women, suggesting elections are particularly important for encouraging women’s participation in local governance. These findings indicate that elections can increase contributions in settings where unelected chiefs lack traditional authority and are appointed by higher entities.

Видео Elected Leaders & Informal Tax Contributions: Experiment Evidence, Village Elections, Kazakhstan канала The Harriman Institute at Columbia University