GTO2-1-04: Social Choice: Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions
This video from Game Theory Online (http://www.game-theory-class.org) formally defines three desirable features for a social welfare function to satisfy, and then states Arrow's Theorem, which shows that no social welfare function can simultaneously satisfy all three criteria. It features Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC).
Видео GTO2-1-04: Social Choice: Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions канала Game Theory Online
Видео GTO2-1-04: Social Choice: Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions канала Game Theory Online
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