Dassault Falcon 50 Splits in Half During Fatal Runway Overrun

On September 27, 2018, about 1346 eastern daylight time, a Dassault Falcon 50, N114TD, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Greenville Downtown Airport (GMU), Greenville, South Carolina. The two pilots were fatally injured, and the two passengers were seriously injured.

The airplane departed from St. Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), Clearwater, Florida, at 1230. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during the approach to GMU, the flight crew had difficulties understanding the navigation fixes that air traffic control had provided. The CVR also showed that the flight crew did not use any prelanding checklist or discuss that no braking was available with the brake system in the "#1-ON" position (the pilot had been copilot for the previous four flights in the airplane, during which this condition was present). At 1345:34, the CVR recorded the sound of touchdown. At 1345:38, the pilot stated that the brakes were not operating. He and the copilot commented about the lack of brakes several more times before the airplane went over the embankment.

Air traffic controllers at GMU reported that the airplane touched down "normally" at a standard touchdown point on the runway. They saw the airplane's thrust reverser deploy and watched as the airplane continued down the runway without decelerating.

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating for the Dassault Falcon 50 with a limitation for second-in-command privileges only.

The co-pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land. He did not hold any type ratings nor did he hold an instrument rating.

The Dassault Falcon 50 was a midsize long-range business jet. The three engines were mounted at the rear of the airplane with the left engine identified as No. 1, the center engine identified as No. 2, and the right engine identified as No. 3. A thrust reverser was located on the No. 2 engine. The airplane was equipped with two independent hydraulic systems, which provided hydraulic power to several onboard systems including the airplane's brakes. System 1 provided hydraulic pressure for normal braking (with antiskid), while system 2 provided hydraulic pressure for emergency braking and parking brake. Selection of normal or emergency braking was done via a switch labeled "BRAKE" that was located on the instrument panel. The "#1-ON" position of the switch selected normal braking utilizing system 1, and provided antiskid protection, while the "2-OFF" position selected emergency braking and did not provide antiskid.

According to the operator's director of maintenance, the airplane had been kept in storage in a hangar for about 4 years. In June 2018, a work order was generated to return the airplane to a serviceable status. The work order included a 12-month inspection, a 12-month or 500-hour inspection, a 24-month inspection, and a 36-month inspection. The work order also indicated that a total of 103 discrepancies found during the ongoing inspections needed to be addressed. The work order was about 60% complete at the time of the accident, and there were indication that the airplane was airworthy.

A review of the airplane braking system components at the scene of the accident showed that the parking brake handle was in the stowed position and the brake switch was found in the "#1-ON" position. Next to the brake switch was a sticker indicating, "ATA# 32-5 'INOP' DATE: 9/27/18" (ATA code 32-5 involves the antiskid system).

CT scan performed on the antiskid system components revealed a broken solder joint on the left-side inboard transducer and a bent pin connection on the right-side inboard transducer. Functional tests of the antiskid wheel speed transducers revealed a failure in the operation of the left-side inboard wheel speed transducer. Visual inspection of the wiring for the right-side wheel speed transducers found that the wiring to the right outboard transducer was reversed.

According to the pilot who conducted four flights in the airplane before the accident flight, upon application of the brakes with the brake switch in the "#1-ON" position, braking was normal at low speeds (estimated to be 15-20 knots) but at faster speeds, no braking was available. Braking was restored when the brake switch was placed in the "#2-OFF" position. This pilot stated that he reported the brake system failure to the company's director of maintenance after the first two flights (in late August and early September 2018) and indicated his belief that the source of the problem was the antiskid system. This pilot also stated that the last two flights occurred 7 and 8 days before the accident flight and that the accident pilot was the copilot for all four flights.

Nothing had been done to resolve the issue. The airplane's flight manual clearly indicates that in the event of a brake failure or ions antiskid, the brake switch be moved to the #2 position.

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