Train Crashes Into Barge

On November 13, 2021, about 2343 local time, the towing vessel Baxter Southern had pushed its tow of four empty barges against the shoreline of the Upper Mississippi River at mile 372 near Galland, lowa, when a BNSF coal train transiting the track along the shoreline struck the bow rake of a forward barge that was overhanging the railroad track. Two locomotives and ten hopper cars (loaded with coal) derailed, and six of the derailed hopper cars entered the river. A sheen was observed in the river following the derailment. The two train personnel sustained minor injuries. Damages to the locomotive and freight cars were estimated at $1.9 million. The barge sustained minor scrapes.

As the Baxter Southern and its tow of four empty barges moved southerly on the Upper Mississippi River, they encountered strong wind gusts. The wind made it unsafe for the tow to continue, and in the dark of night, it was also unsafe for the captain to try to turn around the tow and head upriver.

It is considered normal for tug and barges transiting on the inland waterways of the United States to push up against the riverbank — whether to wait for river traffic to decrease, bad weather to pass, for lock openings, or to conduct maintenance. While searching the electronic chart on the ECS for an area to push the tow against the shoreline, the captain and pilot stated that they assumed the area marked by a magenta dashed line next to the right descending bank near mile 372 was a fleeting area-where towing vessels and barges would be able to push up against the riverbank. However, the magenta dashed line actually represented a caution area, which warned of the risk of embankment erosion and of train collision due to the channel's proximity to the railroad trackbed.

The pilot was familiar with the area and stated that he had previously seen towing vessels and barges push up along the right descending bank near the caution area identified on the ECS. Neither the pilot nor the captain queried the exclamation point near the area on the ECS as a part of their navigational assessment to gather further information related to the dashed magenta line. Thus, they missed the cautionary information that stated the area presented a "Railroad Collision and Trackbed Erosion Risk."

The captain and pilot each had over 20 years of experience on the Mississippi River and had extensively used Rose Point over the last several years; they also had completed training in the operation of Rose Point and interpreting its information. They should have been familiar with the magenta dashed line identifying the caution area and how to query the chart to see additional information about marked areas.

After the casualty, Coast Guard Sector Upper Mississippi River issued Marine Safety Information Bulletin 08-21, which advised towing vessel operators to use caution in all river water level conditions when pushing up against the shoreline where railroad tracks were located near the water's edge to avoid encroaching on the railroad track.

As the Baxter Southern tow prepared to push up against the riverbank, the captain determined that, due to the nighttime conditions and high wind gusts, it was unsafe to send a lookout forward on the lead barge, STC 3020. Instead, the captain had three crew members proceed up to the bow of STC 3020 after the barge was pushed up against the riverbank to determine the location of the barge in relation to the railroad track. Due to the train's approach within a few minutes of pushing up, the crew members did not reach the bow of the STC 3020 before the collision.

After the pilot, who was in the wheelhouse, and the crew of the Baxter Southern, who were out on deck, saw the light of the approaching train as it came into view about 2,000 feet away from the tow, they had about 35 seconds to respond.

On the train, the conductor and engineer did not have any indication that the Baxter Southern tow was pushed up against the riverbank before they visually saw the tow about 1,000 feet away. In addition, they did not realize that the bow of the STC 3020 had encroached on the tracks until the train was about 300 feet from the barge and still traveling about 37 mph. At that point, the train's engineer activated the train's emergency brake on the three locomotives and all the hopper cars at 2343:42. After the Baxter Southern's pilot saw the sparks from the train and realized that the train was not going to be able to stop, he put the tug's engines in full astern to move the tug and barge away from the riverbank. However, the engines took 4.5 seconds to respond because of the pneumatic throttle control, delaying the movement of the towing vessel and barges from the riverbank at a time-critical moment. With only seconds to respond, the activation of the train's emergency brake and the placement of the tug's engines in full astern occurred too late to avoid the collision.

00:00 Accident video
01:07 Investigative information

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